On liberalism: (Tradução autorizada)

On liberalism

(Tradução autorizada)

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.70622/2238-7110.2026.702

Keywords:

liberalism, freedom, pluralism, freedom of religion, freedom of speech

Abstract

Liberals see human beings as subjects, not objects. They reject despotism in its many forms. With Justice Robert Jackson, liberals believe that “compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.” Liberal authoritarianism is an oxymoron. Illiberal democracy is illiberal, and liberals oppose it for that reason. Liberals are puzzled by many of those, on the left and the right, who describe themselves as “antiliberal” or “postliberal.” With respect to some claims of “antiliberals” or “postliberals,” liberals agree with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman: “The refutation of a caricature can be no more than a caricature of refutation.” With respect to those claims of “antiliberals” or “postliberals” that do not amount to a caricature, liberals insist on the importance of freedom of thought and action and deliberative democracy, and on the need to respect reasonable pluralism.

Author Biographies

Cass R. Sunstein, Faculdade de Direito de Harvard

Professor Universitário Robert Walmsley em Harvard.

Maíra Villela Almeida, Universidade Estácio de Sá – UNESA, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil

Professora da graduação e do PPGD da Universidade Estácio de Sá, onde também é pesquisadora e contemplada com bolsa de pesquisa produtividade. Doutora e Mestra em Direito pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (PPGD/UFRJ). Visiting researcher pela Harvard Law School com o apoio da Comissão Fulbright.

Letícia Pinheiro Wienskoski, Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil

Doutoranda e mestra em Direito da Regulação pela FGV Direito Rio. Foi visiting researcher na Universidade de Lisboa.

References

BLUM, Walter J.; KALVEN, Harry. The uneasy case for progressive taxation. The University of Chicago Law Review, Chicago, v. 19, n. 3, p. 417-520, 1952.

BUCKLEY, William F. Our mission statement. National Review, New York, v. 19, 1955.

CHAPMAN, Nathan S.; McCONNELL, Michael W. Agreeing to disagree: how the establishment clause protects religious diversity and freedom of conscience. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023.

CONLY, Sarah. Against autonomy: justifying coercive paternalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

DEWEY, John. Pragmatic America. In: WEBER, Eric Thomas. America's public philosopher: essays on social justice, economics, education, and the future of democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021.

DWORKIN, Ronald. Law's empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.

FEARON, James D. Deliberation as discussion. In: ELSTER, Jon. Deliberative democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 44-68.

FULLER, Lon L. The morality of law. 2. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.

GOODIN, Robert. No smoking: the ethical issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.

HAMBURGER, Philip. Is administrative law unlawful?. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.

HAYEK, Friedrich. The origins and effects of our morals: a problem for science. In: NISHIYAMA, Chiaki; LEUBE, Kurt. The essence of Hayek. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984.

HAZONY, Yoram. Conservatism: a rediscovery. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 2022.

HOLMES Jr., Oliver Wendell. Times change. Lapham's Quarterly, New York, 1897.

HOLMES, Stephen. The anatomy of antiliberalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

HORWITZ, Morton J. The rule of law: an unqualified human good?. Yale Law Journal, New Haven, v. 86, n. 3, p. 561-566, 1977.

KAHNEMAN, Daniel; TVERSKY, Amos. On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, Washington, DC, v. 103, n. 3, p. 582-591, 1996.

MASHAW, Jerry. Reasoned administration and democratic legitimacy: how administrative law supports democratic government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

MILL, John Stuart. On liberty, utilitarianism and other essays. Editado por Mark Philip e Frederick Rosen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

MILL, John Stuart. The subjection of women. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001.

MILL, John Stuart; HOLMES, Oliver Wendell. Freedom of thought. In: Readings in contemporary problems in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 1930. p. 712-750.

NUSSBAUM, Martha. Perfectionist liberalism and political liberalism. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Hoboken, v. 39, n. 1, p. 3-45, 2011.

PARFIT, Derek. On what matters. Editado por Samuel Scheffler. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. v. 1.

PARFIT, Derek. On what matters. Editado por Samuel Scheffler. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. v. 2.

RAWLS, John. Political liberalism: expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

SUNSTEIN, Cass R. The anticaste principle. Michigan Law Review, Ann Arbor, v. 92, n. 8, p. 2410-2455, 1994.

SUNSTEIN, Cass R. Incompletely theorized agreements. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, MA, v. 108, n. 7, p. 1733-1772, 1995.

SUNSTEIN, Cass R. Has liberalism ruined everything?. Contemporary Political Theory, London, v. 19, p. 175-187, 2020.

SUNSTEIN, Cass R. "Come on, man!" On errors, choice, and Hayekian behavioral economics. Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge, v. 7, n. 1, p. 212-218, 2023.

ULLMANN-MARGALIT, Edna. The emergence of norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

ULLMANN-MARGALIT, Edna. Considerateness. In: MARGALIT, Avishai; SUNSTEIN, Cass R. Normal rationality: decisions and social order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 226-257.

Published

2026-08-18

How to Cite

R. Sunstein, C., Villela Almeida, M., & Pinheiro Wienskoski, L. (2026). On liberalism: (Tradução autorizada). Direito Em Movimento, 24, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.70622/2238-7110.2026.702

Similar Articles

1 2 3 4 5 > >> 

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.

Loading...